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It’s Time to Regulate Stablecoins as Deposits and
Require Their Issuers to Be FDIC-Insured Banks
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.*
December 16, 2021
Introduction
In November 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) issued a
report analyzing the rapid expansion and growing risks of the stablecoin market. As explained in
PWG’s report, “[s]tablecoins are digital assets that are designed to maintain a stable value
relative to a national currency or other reference assets.”1 PWG’s report determined that
stablecoins pose a wide range of potential hazards, including the risks of inflicting large losses
on investors, destabilizing financial markets and the payments system, supporting money
laundering, tax evasion, and other forms of illicit finance, and promoting dangerous
concentrations of economic and financial power.
PWG’s report called on Congress to pass legislation that would (i) require all issuers of
stablecoins to be banks that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
and (ii) “ensure that payment stablecoins are subject to appropriate federal prudential oversight
on a consistent and comprehensive basis.” PWG also recommended that federal agencies and
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) should use their “existing authorities” to
“address risks associated with payment stablecoin arrangements . . . to the extent possible.”2

*Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets et al., Report on Stablecoins (Nov. 2021) (quote at 1)
[hereinafter PWG Stablecoin Report], https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/StableCoinReport_Nov1_508.pdf;
see also Alexis Goldstein, Written Testimony before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 1
(Dec. 14, 2021) (“Stablecoins are crypto assets that attempt to maintain a stable value, either through a basket of
reserve assets acting as collateral (asset-backed stablecoins), or through algorithms (algorithmic stablecoins).”)
[hereinafter Goldstein Testimony], https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Goldstein%20Testimony%201214-21.pdf. This paper focuses on asset-backed stablecoins, which account for most of the stablecoin market.
2
PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 16, 18.

At present, stablecoins are mainly used to make payments for trades in cryptocurrency
markets and to provide collateral for derivatives and lending transactions involving
cryptocurrencies.3 However, technology companies are exploring a much broader range of
potential uses for stablecoins, including their use as digital currencies for making purchases and
sales of goods and services as well as person-to-person payments. In October, Facebook
launched a “pilot” of its Novi “digital currency wallet,” which uses the Pax Dollar stablecoin as
its first digital currency.4 Novi enables its customers to make person-to-person payments within
and across national borders and is part of Facebook’s larger plan to establish itself as “a
challenger in the payments system.”5 Facebook intends to “migrate” Novi’s digital wallet to its
proposed Diem stablecoin as soon as Facebook receives regulatory approvals for Diem.6
Facebook’s launch of Novi indicates that stablecoins could potentially become a form of
“private money” that is widely used in consumer and commercial transactions. Federal agencies
have not yet issued rules governing the issuance and distribution of stablecoins. Federal and
state officials have only rarely enforced consumer and investor protection laws against issuers
and distributors of stablecoins. PWG’s report calls on federal agencies and Congress to take

Id. at 7-10; see also Andrew Ackerman, “Stablecoins in Spotlight as U.S. Begins to Lay Ground for Rules on
Cryptocurrencies,” Wall Street Journal (Sept. 25, 2021) (“For now, stablecoins are used mainly by investors to buy
and sell crypto assets on exchanges . . . [and] as collateral for derivatives”),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/stablecoins-in-spotlight-as-u-s-begins-to-lay-ground-for-rules-on-cryptocurrencies11632562202?mod=article_inline; Statement by SEC Chair Gary Gensler, “President’s Working Group Report on
Stablecoins” (Nov. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Gensler Statement], https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/genslerstatement-presidents-working-group-report-stablecoins-110121 (stating that “more than 75 percent of trading on all
crypto trading platforms occurred between a stablecoin and some other token” in October 2021).
4
See infra notes 17-21, 45-47 and accompanying text.
5
Hannah Murphy & Siddarth Venkataramakrishnan, “Facebook says ready to launch digital wallet,” Financial
Times (Aug. 18, 2021) (quoting David Marcus, who was then the leader of Facebook’s Novi project),
https://www.ft.com/content/a8512417-1fde-481a-b282-2f892e3c3b51; Siddarth Venkataramakrishnan & Hannah
Murphy, “Facebook launches digital wallet Novi,” Financial Times (Oct. 19, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/b9a61950-a32c-4c77-95fe-fc0d00021a0f.
6
Venkataramakrishnan & Murphy, supra note 5 (quoting David Marcus).
3
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immediate steps to establish a federal oversight regime that could respond effectively to the
dangers created by stablecoins.7
This paper strongly supports three regulatory approaches recommended in PWG’s report.
First, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should use its available powers to regulate
stablecoins as “securities” and protect investors and securities markets. However, the scope of
the SEC’s authority to regulate stablecoins is not clear, and federal securities laws do not provide
adequate safeguards to control the systemic threats that stablecoins pose to financial stability and
the payments system.
Second, the Department of Justice (DOJ) should designate stablecoins as “deposits” and
should bring enforcement actions to prevent issuers and distributors of stablecoins from
unlawfully receiving “deposits” in violation of Section 21(a) of the Glass-Steagall Act. Section
21(a) offers a promising avenue for regulatory action, but its provisions contain uncertainties and
gaps and do not provide a complete remedy for the hazards created by stablecoins. The most
significant gap in Section 21(a) allows state (and possibly federal) banking authorities to charter
special-purpose depository institutions that could issue and distribute stablecoins without
obtaining deposit insurance from the FDIC.
Third, Congress should adopt legislation mandating that all issuers and distributors of
stablecoins must be FDIC-insured banks. That requirement would compel all stablecoin issuers

7

PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 2-3, 10-18. For additional discussions of the dangers created by
stablecoins and possible regulatory responses to those perils, see Ackerman, supra note 3; Testimony by Hilary J.
Allen before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Dec. 14, 2021) [hereinafter Allen
Testimony], https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Allen%20Testimony%2012-14-211.pdf; Dan Awrey,
Bad Money, 106 Cornell Law Review 1, 6-8, 39-45 (2020); Nate DiCamillo, “The US is dragging its heels on critical
stablecoin regulations,” Quartz (Nov. 8, 2021), https://qz.com/2083636/what-are-stablecoins-and-how-will-they-beregulated/; Gary Gorton & Jeffrey Y. Zhang, “Taming Wildcat Stablecoins” (Sept. 30, 2021), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3888752; Jeanna Smialek, “Why Washington Worries About Stablecoins,” New York Times
(Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/business/economy/federal-reserve-virtual-currencystablecoin.html.

3

and distributors and their parent companies to comply with federal laws that protect the safety,
soundness, and stability of our banking system and obligate banks to operate in a manner
consistent with the public interest. Requiring stablecoin issuers and distributors to be FDICinsured banks would also maintain the longstanding U.S. policy of separating banking and
commerce. It would prevent Facebook and other Big Tech firms from using stablecoin ventures
as building blocks for “shadow banking” empires that would erode consumer protections, impair
competition, subvert the effectiveness of financial regulation, and potentially unleash systemic
crises across our financial and commercial sectors during severe economic downturns and
financial disruptions.
Analysis
1.

The Rapid Expansion and Escalating Risks of Stablecoins

The volume of outstanding stablecoins has mushroomed during the past two years,
growing from less than $6 billion in January 2020 to $150 billion in December 2021.8 The rapid
expansion of the stablecoin market has mirrored the explosive growth of all cryptocurrency
markets. The total market capitalization of cryptocurrencies increased almost nine-fold – from
$350 billion to $3 trillion – between September 2020 and November 2021.9
At present, stablecoins are mainly used to speculate in cryptocurrencies and other digital
assets. Stablecoins are the leading form of payment for trades executed on cryptocurrency
exchanges, and stablecoins are used as collateral for derivatives and lending transactions
involving digital assets. In addition, stablecoins play “a central role in facilitating trading,

The Block, “Stablecoins: Total Stablecoin Supply” (visited on Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins.
9
Office of Financial Research, Annual Report to Congress 2021, at 49 [hereinafter OFR 2021 Annual Report],
https://www.financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/OFR-Annual-Report-2021.pdf; Yvonne Lau,
“Cryptocurrencies hit market cap of $3 trillion for the first time as Bitcoin and Ether reach record highs,” Fortune
(Nov. 9, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/11/09/cryptocurrency-market-cap-3-trillion-bitcion-ether-shiba-inu/.
8
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lending, and borrowing activity” in decentralized finance (DeFi) transactions. DeFi transactions
are completed by using smart contracts and “autonomous” distributed ledgers instead of
organized exchanges.10
Stablecoins enable participants to trade in cryptocurrencies and engage in other digital
asset transactions while avoiding the use of fiat currencies and traditional financial institutions.
Stablecoins offer a much higher degree of anonymity in conducting such transactions, and many
participants use stablecoins to avoid complying with “Know Your Customer” (KYC)
requirements, anti-money laundering (AML) laws, tax laws, and sanctions against terrorist
financing.11 “[V]irtually no KYC/AML checks” are conducted for DeFi transactions, and
criminals can “launder proceeds of crime” by exchanging other assets for stablecoins (or vice
versa) while “hiding the blockchain money trail.”12
Tether, the largest issuer of stablecoins, has issued over $80 billion of stablecoins and
controls a majority of the stablecoin market.13 Tether and the issuers of most other leading
stablecoins represent to the public that they hold sufficient “reserves” to maintain a 1-for-1 parity

10

PWG Report, supra note 1, at 5-10 (quote at 9); see also Allen Testimony, supra note 7, at 2-3, 6-14; Goldstein
Testimony, supra note 1, at 1-5, 10-13; Gary Silverman, “Cryptocurrency: rise of decentralized finance sparks ‘dirty
money’ fears,” Financial Times (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/beeb2f8c-99ec-494b-aa76a7be0bf9dae6.
11
PWG Report, supra note 1, at 1-2, 10-11, 19-21; Gensler Statement, supra note 3; Goldstein Testimony, supra
note 1, at 1-2, 5, 13-15; Smialek, supra note 7; see also Zeke Faux, “Anyone Seen Tether’s Billions?”, Bloomberg
BusinessWeek (Oct. 7, 2021) (“Tether Holdings checks the identity of people who buy coins directly from the
company, but once the currency is out in the world, it can be transferred anonymously, just by sending a code. A
drug lord can hold millions of Tethers in a digital wallet and send it to a terrorist without anyone knowing.”),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-07/crypto-mystery-where-s-the-69-billion-backing-thestablecoin-tether?sref=f7rH2jWS; JP Koning, “What Happens If All Stablecoin Users Have to Be Identified?”,
CoinDesk (Sept. 14, 2021) (“Right now, a large chunk of stablecoin usage is pseudonymous. That is, you or I can
hold $20,000 worth of tether or USD coin stablecoins in an unhosted wallet (i.e., not on an exchange), without
having to provide our identities to either Tether or Circle.”), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/02/18/whathappens-if-all-stablecoin-users-have-to-be-identified/; Silverman, supra note 10 (reporting on the belief of some
cryptocurrency entrepreneurs that “DeFi innovations . . . will enable them to break free of [KYC] obligations”).
12
Goldstein Testimony, supra note 1, at 5, 14 (including quotes from a report, dated Oct. 18, 2021, by Elliptic, a
cryptocurrency compliance firm); see also Silverman, supra note 10 (reporting that DeFi “allows a wave of
innovation by people trying to launder money through the system”) (quoting David Jevans, CEO of CipherTrace, a
cryptocurrency intelligence company).
13
The Block, supra note 8.
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between their stablecoins and the U.S. dollar. However, there are substantial doubts about the
adequacy of reserves held by Tether and other issuers. Tether and its affiliates paid more than
$60 million to settle charges filed by the Office of the New York Attorney General and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, alleging that Tether’s representations about its
reserves were false and materially misleading.14 In 2021, Tether disclosed that a majority of its
reserves consisted of commercial paper and other corporate obligations (reportedly including
debts of Chinese companies). At best, the reserves of Tether and other leading stablecoin issuers
resemble the assets held by prime money market funds, which experienced systemic investor
runs and were forced to accept bailouts from the federal government in 2008 and 2020.15
As discussed in PWG’s report, some technology companies have “the stated ambition” to
create stablecoin programs that can be “used widely by retail users to pay for goods and services,
by corporations in the context of supply chain payments, and in the context of international
remittances.”16 Facebook’s launch of Novi in October 2021 is a “pilot” for Facebook’s planned
creation of a global digital payments network that will ultimately use Facebook’s proposed Diem
stablecoin. Novi is available initially to customers in the U.S. and Guatemala, and its first digital
currency is the stablecoin USDP (Pax Dollar), issued by Paxos.17

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Press Release No. 8450-21, “CFTC Orders Tether and Bitfinex to Pay
Fines Totaling $42.5 Million” (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8450-21; Office of
the N.Y. Attorney General, Press Release, “Attorney General James Ends Virtual Currency Trading Platform
Bitfinex’s Illegal Activities in New York” (Feb. 23, 2021) (imposing an $18.5 million fine on Tether and its
affiliates), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021/attorney-general-james-ends-virtual-currency-trading-platformbitfinexs-illegal.
15
Faux, supra note 11; Goldstein Testimony, supra note 1, at 2-5; OFR 2021 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 51-52;
Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 6-16, 21-24; Bill Nelson & Paige Pidano Paridon, “Stablecoins are backed by
‘reserves’? Give us a break,” American Banker (Dec. 10, 2021), available at 2021 WLNR 40403852; Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., “The Pandemic Crisis Shows That the World Remains Trapped in a ‘Global Doom Loop’ of Financial
Instability, Rising Debt Levels, and Escalating Bailouts,” 40 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report No. 8
(Aug. 2020), at 1, 9-10, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3901967 [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Pandemic Crisis”];
Yueqi Yang, “Tether Fails to Dispel Mystery on Stablecoin’s Crucial Reserves,” Bloomberg Law (Dec. 3, 2021).
16
PWG Report, supra note 1, at 8.
17
Venkataramakrishnan & Murphy, supra note 5; see also Novi Financial, Inc., “Meet Novi,”
https://www.novi.com/.
14
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According to Facebook, “Novi is a digital wallet that helps you send and receive money
instantly and securely.” Novi’s customers can send and receive payments by using “digital
currencies, starting with USDP (Pax Dollar). When you add money to your Novi account, we’ll
convert it to USDP. On Novi, 1 USDP is equal to 1 US dollar.”18 Novi’s terms of service allow
customers to redeem their stablecoins from Novi based on the same 1-for-1 parity between the
Pax Dollar and the U.S. dollar.19
Facebook’s launch of Novi indicates that stablecoins could potentially expand from their
current roles in cryptocurrency trading and other digital asset transactions to a much broader
range of uses in consumer and commercial transactions. On October 19, 2021, David Marcus,
who was then head of Novi, described Facebook’s ambitions to create a general-use digital
payments network:
Beyond the pilot, our business model is clear. We’re a challenger in payments.
We’ll offer free person-to-person payments using Novi. Once we have a solid
customer base, we’ll offer cheaper merchant payments and make a profit on
merchant services.20
Marcus explained that “our support for Diem hasn’t changed and we intend to launch
Novi with Diem once it receives regulatory approval.” Marcus also confirmed that Novi planned
to offer “interoperability” in payments between Facebook’s Diem, Pax Dollar, and other
stablecoins.21

Novi Financial, Inc., “Novi: How It Works,” https://www.novi.com/how-it-works.
Novi Financial, Inc., “Terms of Service (Last Modified: October 19, 2021)” [hereinafter Novi Terms of Service],
¶ 3 (“User Redemption Right”) (“You are entitled to redeem each Digital Currency for one U.S. dollar (USD) with
Novi.”), https://www.novi.com/legal/app/us/terms-of-service?temp_locale=en_US
20
Tweet by David Marcus (Oct. 19, 2021), https://twitter.com/davidmarcus/status/1450447444379013122 (visited
on Dec. 15, 2021).
21
Id.; see also Venkataramakrishnan & Murphy, supra note 5 (reporting on Marcus’ statements about Facebook’s
ambitions for Novi).
18
19
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As discussed in PWG’s report, stablecoins present a wide array of potential hazards,
including deceptive marketing, fraudulent and manipulative trading, abusive and predatory
terms, and facilitating evasion of KYC/AML requirements, tax laws, and sanctions against
terrorist financing.22 This paper focuses on four systemic dangers posed by stablecoins, which
are also analyzed in PWG’s report. First, investors in stablecoins could suffer large losses from
investor runs triggered by concerns about the adequacy of stablecoin reserves. Investor runs on
stablecoins would likely resemble the investor runs that occurred in 2008 and 2020 in prime
money market funds, which invest (like stablecoins) in securities that are not issued or
guaranteed by the federal government. Stablecoins are also similar to the private banknotes that
state-chartered banks issued before the Civil War. Many state-chartered banks experienced runs
by holders of their banknotes during that period because they did not hold adequate reserves and
their notes were not guaranteed by the federal government.23
Second, the collapse of a major stablecoin could destabilize financial markets. For
example, a default by Tether – the leading form of payment used in cryptocurrency transactions
– would probably cause widespread trading failures as well as fire sales in cryptocurrency
markets. If stablecoins became a widely-accepted medium of payment for purchases and sales of
goods and services in the general economy, the failure of a leading stablecoin could trigger a

22

PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 1-2, 10-11, 19-21; Goldstein Testimony, supra note 1, at 5-15; see also
Letter from Open Markets Institute to federal regulatory agencies, dated Nov. 23, 2021, expressing concerns about
“Facebook’s Digital Asset Wallet Pilot” [hereinafter Open Markets Facebook Letter], at 1-7,
https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org/publications/letter-to-regulators-grave-risks-of-facebook-digital-wallet-pilot.
23
PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 1-2, 10-12; see also Ackerman, supra note 3; Awrey, supra note 7, at 36, 11-18, 33-39; Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 21-31; James Mackintosh, “Bitcoin’s Reliance on Stablecoins
Harks Back to the Wild West of Finance,” Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoins-reliance-on-stablecoins-harks-back-to-the-wild-west-of-finance11622115246.; Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, “Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and Shinplasters,” 6
Quarterly Review No. 3, at 10-19 (Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, Fall 1982).
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generalized run on stablecoins that might shut down the payments system and inflict widespread
losses on consumers, business firms, and financial institutions.24
Third, issuers and distributors of stablecoins are rapidly becoming a new category of
systemically important “shadow banks.” Shadow banks provide functional substitutes for
deposits (“shadow deposits”) and offer other financial services that mimic the activities of banks
while avoiding compliance with federal laws that establish essential safeguards for the safety,
soundness, and stability of our banking system. The systemic significance of stablecoin issuers
would increase exponentially if stablecoins are widely accepted as a medium of payment in
consumer and commercial transactions. Under those circumstances, stablecoins would likely
become a systemically important form of “private money” comparable to money market funds,
which do not have explicit government backing but rely on general expectations of government
support during severe economic downturns or financial crises.25
Fourth, issuers and distributors of stablecoins are permitted to combine their financial
activities with commercial ventures because they are not defined as “banks” for purposes of the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act). Like other shadow banks, issuers and distributors of
stablecoins are not subject to the BHC Act’s longstanding policy of separating banking and
commerce.26 As the PWG’s report correctly pointed out,

24

PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 1-3, 12-14; see also OFR 2021 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 49-54;
Sam Knight, “Biden Administration Is Playing With Fire by Failing to Regulate Cryptocurrency,” Truthout (Nov.
16, 2021), https://truthout.org/articles/biden-administration-is-playing-with-fire-by-failing-to-regulatecryptocurrency/.
25
PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 1-3, 7-14; see also Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 3-6, 21-24, 33, 38;
Wilmarth, “Pandemic Crisis,” supra note 15, at 6-13, 16-17; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Taming the Megabanks: Why
We Need a New Glass-Steagall Act 150-57, 279-88, 341-44, 353-56 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2020) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks].
26
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(c), 1843; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s and FDIC’s Attempts to Confer Banking
Privileges on Nonbanks and Commercial Firms Violate Federal Laws and Are Contrary to Public Policy,” 39
Banking & Financial Services Policy Report No. 10 (Oct. 2020), at 1, 6-11, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3750964 [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Banking Privileges”]; see also Gorton & Zhang, supra
note 7, at 17-19.
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[T]he combination of a stablecoin issuer or wallet provider and a commercial firm
could lead to an excessive concentration of economic power. These policy
concerns are analogous to those traditionally associated with the mixing of
banking and commerce, such as advantages in accessing credit or using data to
market or restrict access to products. This combination could have detrimental
effects on competition and lead to market concentration in sectors of the real
economy.27
As explained below in Part 2(c), permitting issuers and distributors of stablecoins to operate
without being chartered and regulated as FDIC-insured banks would enable Facebook and other
Big Tech firms to enter the banking business and undermine the BHC Act’s policy of separating
banks from commercial enterprises. Allowing Big Tech firms to subvert that policy would
inflict great harm on our financial system, economy, and society.
2.

Regulatory Strategies for Controlling the Dangers of Stablecoins

This section strongly endorses three regulatory approaches discussed in PWG’s report for
addressing the perils created by stablecoins. First, the SEC should use its existing powers to
regulate stablecoins as “securities” and protect investors and securities markets. Second, DOJ
should designate stablecoins as “deposits” and bring enforcement actions to prevent issuers and
distributors of stablecoins from violating Section 21(a) of the Glass-Steagall Act. Third, to
overcome uncertainties and gaps that limit the effectiveness of SEC and DOJ remedies, Congress
should pass legislation requiring all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured
banks.28

27
28

PWG Stablecoin Report, supra note 1, at 14.
Id. at 2-3, 15-18.
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a.

The SEC should use its existing powers to regulate stablecoins as
“securities.”

The SEC should exercise its existing authority to regulate stablecoins as “securities,”
thereby requiring issuers and distributors of stablecoins to comply with federal securities laws
that protect investors and securities markets by (1) prohibiting fraud and manipulation in
purchases and sales of securities and (2) imposing registration and disclosure duties on those
who sell securities to the public. As discussed below, the SEC would face difficult legal
challenges in regulating stablecoins as “securities.” In addition, the SEC does not possess the
broad prudential oversight powers that federal bank regulators can wield to address systemic
risks and promote financial stability. Consequently, vigorous efforts by the SEC to regulate
stablecoins as “securities” would be a very helpful step, but it would not provide an adequate
remedy for the systemic perils created by stablecoins.
The SEC would confront potentially significant obstacles in showing that stablecoins are
“securities,” especially with regard to stablecoins that do not pay interest and are used solely for
the purpose of buying and selling goods and services for consumption. To establish legal
grounds for regulating stablecoins as “securities,” the SEC must show that stablecoins are
“investment contracts” or “notes” (debt obligations) as defined in federal securities laws.29
Under the Supreme Court’s Howey decision, an “investment contract” is a “scheme [that]
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others.”30 In SEC v. Edwards, the Supreme Court explained that the “profits” referred
to in Howey are “the profits that investors seek on their investment . . . in the sense of income or

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10), 80a-2(a)(36); Todd Phillips, The SEC’s Regulatory Role in the Digital
Assets Markets 5-7 (Center for American Progress, Oct. 2020), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3964632.
30
SEC v. W.J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see also Phillips, supra note 29, at 5-6.
29

11

return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of the
investment.” The Court also held in Edwards that “fixed returns” on “investments pitched as
low-risk” would satisfy the Howey test, and the ability of investors to redeem their investments
would not affect that outcome.31
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court held that every promissory “note” is
presumptively a “security.” However, that presumption can be rebutted based on several factors,
including whether “the buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to
generate,” or, in contrast, whether “the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a
minor asset or consumer good.” Reves held that courts should also consider (1) whether the note
is an instrument in which there is “common trading for speculation or investment,” and (2)
whether “the existence of another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the
instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.”32
Federal district courts concluded in several cases that cryptocurrencies created by sellers
with fluctuating values were “investment contracts” and “securities” under federal securities
laws. In those cases, the sellers represented that their cryptocurrencies could increase in value
and provide investment gains to the buyers.33 None of those cases involved stablecoins having a
fixed value with reference to widely-used fiat currencies or other ostensibly “safe” assets, and
there do not appear to be any reported court decisions addressing the issue of whether such
stablecoins are “securities.”

31

SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394-97 (2004).
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64-67 (1990); see also Phillips, supra note 29, at 6.
33
See, e.g., SEC v. NAC Foundation, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 2d 988, 994-97 (N.D. Cal. 2021); SEC v. Kik Interactive
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 169, 177-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 352, 364-79
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); Balestra v. ATBCoin LLC, 380 F. Supp. 2d 340, 352-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); SEC v. Shavers, No.
4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *4-*8 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014).
32
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Issuers of the most widely-used stablecoins (including Tether, USD Coin, and Pax
Dollar) represent that their stablecoins will maintain a 1-to-1 parity with the U.S. dollar by
holding reserves that include cash, government securities, and (in most cases) corporate debt
obligations. Most leading stablecoins do not pay interest to their holders. Thus, instead of
promising potential gains, issuers of most prominent stablecoins assure investors that they will
not suffer losses from buying and holding stablecoins. Those stablecoins are different from
cryptocurrencies that have fluctuating values and offer buyers the possibility of making profits
from trading.34
The SEC could argue that stablecoins should be treated as “investment contracts” or
“notes” because (1) issuers and distributors offer and sell stablecoins to investors with the shared
understanding that stablecoins are the most widely-used form of payment for speculating in
cryptocurrencies and other digital assets;35 and (2) issuers and distributors expect that most
buyers of stablecoins will use their coins to pursue speculative profits by trading in digital assets
or by lending their coins to other traders.36 Thus, a purchase of stablecoins could reasonably be
viewed as the payment of an “entry fee” enabling the buyer to speculate in cryptocurrency
markets, just as the purchase of poker chips permits a gambler to participate and place bets in

Ackerman, supra note 3; Awrey, supra note 7, at 60 n.221; Nikhilesh De, “SEC Chair Hints Some Stablecoins
Are Securities,” CoinDesk (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2021/07/21/sec-chair-hints-somestablecoins-are-securities/; DiCamillo, supra note 7; Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 3, 6-8, 12-16; Smialek, supra
note 7; Wilmarth, “Pandemic Crisis,” supra note 15, at 9-10.
35
See supra notes 3 & 10 and accompanying text.
36
For court decisions that involved interest-bearing debt instruments but also indicated that financial instruments
sold for the purpose of encouraging speculation could be treated as “securities,” see, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging
Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 240-42 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the
defendant broker-dealer sold “investment contracts” that were subject to regulation as “securities” because the
defendant sold negotiable bank certificates of deposits (CDs) accompanied by promises that the defendant would
monitor the quality of the issuing banks, repurchase the CDs on demand, and maintain a “secondary market” in the
CDs, thereby enabling customers to resell their CDs for potential gains without risking any loss of their principal or
accrued interest); Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d 745, 747-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant broker sold
“notes” that were subject to regulation as “securities” because the defendant sold interest-bearing promissory notes
to customers with the understanding that the defendant would use most of the sale proceeds to trade in commodities
and generate profits to pay off the notes).
34
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poker games and tournaments.37 SEC Chair Gary Gensler recently observed that stablecoins are
primarily bought and used for speculative purposes, and he described stablecoins as “acting
almost like poker chips at the casino.”38 The SEC could argue that it would be proper to classify
stablecoins as “notes” because buyers of stablecoins are “primarily motivated by the opportunity
to earn a profit on their money” by using their stablecoins to pay for subsequent speculative
transactions.39
In contrast, if issuers created stablecoins that could be used only to buy and sell goods
and services for consumption, and that could not be used for speculation, it would be much more
difficult for the SEC to characterize those stablecoins as “securities.” As explained above, court
decisions defining “investment contracts” and “notes” have excluded financial instruments that
are purchased solely for the purpose of buying and selling goods, other property, or services for
consumption, and not for potential investment gains.40 Special-purpose, consumption-only
stablecoins do not appear to be part of the present digital asset landscape. However, issuers

37

See Tschetschot v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-38, 2007 WL 518989, at *3 (U.S.T.C., Feb. 20, 2007)
(stating that participants in poker tournaments bought poker chips as part of their “entry fees” for the purpose of
“placing bets, hoping to win” prizes).
38
Gensler Statement, supra note 3; Tory Newmyer, “SEC’s Gensler likens stablecoins to ‘poker chips’ amid calls
for tougher crypto regulation,” Washington Post (Sept. 21, 2021) (quoting from interview with Mr. Gensler),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/09/21/sec-gensler-crypto-stablecoins/; see also Opening Statement
of Sen. Sherrod Brown at a hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Dec. 14,
2021) (“Stablecoins make it easier than ever to risk real dollars on cryptocurrencies.”),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brown%20Statement%2012-14-21.pdf.
39
Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d at 750.
40
See, e.g., SEC v. Kik Interactive, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 179-80 (distinguishing between digital assets purchased for a
“consumptive use” and those bought primarily for their “profit-making potential”); Solis v. Latium Network, Inc.,
No. 18-10255 (SDW) (SCM), 2018 WL 6445543, at *1-*3 (D.N.J., Dec. 10, 2018) (holding that digital tokens sold
by defendants were “securities” because defendants encouraged plaintiffs to “expect a profit” from investing in the
tokens, even though the tokens could also potentially be used to purchase services). For additional analysis of the
distinction between financial instruments used solely for consumption and those purchased for investment gains, see
SEC “Finhub” Staff, “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets” (April 3, 2019), Part II.C.3,
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets; Jay B. Sykes, “Securities
Regulation and Initial Coin Offerings: A Legal Primer,” at 14-19, 26-32 (Congressional Res. Serv. Rep. R45301,
Aug. 31, 2018), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45301.pdf.
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might decide to create such instruments if the SEC succeeded in classifying stablecoins used for
speculation as “securities.”
The SEC could also seek to regulate issuers of stablecoins as investment companies
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act). Issuers of stablecoins that engage
primarily in the business of investing and trading in securities, or engage in that business and
hold more than 40% of their assets in non-government securities, could potentially be treated as
investment companies. There are numerous exemptions in the 1940 Act that might allow some
issuers of stablecoins to avoid being treated as investment companies, and an analysis of those
exemptions is beyond the scope of this paper.41
The SEC’s track record with money market funds – financial instruments that closely
resemble stablecoins – does not inspire confidence that the SEC could effectively control the
systemic dangers of stablecoins by regulating them as investment companies. The SEC’s
regulation of money market funds under the 1940 Act failed to ensure the resilience of those
funds after Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. Lehman’s bankruptcy and default on
its commercial paper triggered systemic runs by investors on money market funds, and the
Treasury Department and Federal Reserve (Fed) were forced to arrange a comprehensive bailout
of those funds. Despite that calamity, the SEC rejected numerous recommendations after 2008 –
including one from FSOC – calling on money market funds to stop offering fixed net asset
values (NAVs) of $1 per share and to use floating NAVs like other mutual funds. The SEC
required institutional prime and tax-exempt money market funds to adopt floating NAVs, and it
permitted non-government money market funds to impose restrictions on redemption. However,
the SEC allowed retail prime money market funds and institutional and retail government money

15 U.S.C. § 80a-3; see Phillips, supra note 29, at 6-7; SEC, “Investment Company Registration and Regulation
Package,” https://www.sec.gov/investment/fast-answers/divisionsinvestmentinvcoreg121504htm.html.
41
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market funds to continue offering deposit-like treatment with fixed NAVs of $1 per share.
Money market funds experienced another series of systemic runs by investors in March 2020 and
were rescued for a second time by the Treasury and the Fed.42
In December 2021, the SEC issued a proposal to amend its money market fund rules to
address the problems revealed by the investor runs of 2020. The SEC’s proposal would increase
liquidity requirements and modify redemption terms for money market funds in order to reduce
incentives for investor runs during periods of financial stress. At the same time, the proposal
conceded that the SEC’s changes to its money market fund rules in 2010 and 2014 did not
achieve their intended purpose and failed to prevent the investor runs of 2020.43
The SEC’s proposal considered – and rejected – the alternative possibility of requiring all
money market funds to use floating NAVs. The proposal acknowledged that a new rule
requiring floating NAVs for all funds would
increase transparency about the risk of money market fund investments. . . . To
the degree that investors in stable NAV funds are currently treating them as if
they were holding U.S. dollars due to a lack of transparency about risks of such
funds, expanding the scope of the floating NAV requirements may enhance
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Michael S. Barr, Howell E. Jackson & Margaret E. Tahyar, Financial Regulation: Law & Policy 1302-24 (2d ed.
2018); Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 21-24; Wilmarth, “Pandemic Crisis,” supra note 15, at 4-8, 11-12;
Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra note 25, at 153-57, 279-88, 341-44; see also Marco Cypriani & Gabrielle
La Spada, “Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Runs” (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Rep. No. 956, Dec. 2020),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr956.pdf; Lei Li, Yi Li, Marco
Macchiavelli & Xing (Alex) Zhou, “Liquidity Restrictions, Runs, and Central Bank Interventions: Evidence from
Money Market Funds” (May 24, 2021), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607593.
43
Securities and Exchange Commission, “Money Market Fund Reforms: Proposed rule” (Dec. 15, 2021)
[hereinafter SEC Money Market Fund Proposal], https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2021/ic-34441.pdf. For the
SEC’s explanation of why its changes to money market fund rules in 2010 and 2014 were inadequate and did not
prevent the investor runs of March 2020, see id. at 10-31, 81-97.
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investor protections and enable investors to make more informed investment
decisions.44
The SEC’s proposal also recognized that requiring floating NAVs for all funds “would
reduce the distortions arising out of implicit government guarantees of money market funds” and
likely cause “investors of stable NAV funds to reallocate capital into cash accounts subject to
deposit insurance.”45 The resulting shrinkage of the money market fund industry would reduce
the demand for short-term wholesale funding instruments, such as securities repurchase
agreements (repos) and commercial paper. Money market funds are the most prominent
investors in repos and commercial paper. Those short-term debt instruments also function as
“shadow deposits” (functional substitutes for bank deposits), and they experienced their own
systemic breakdowns in 2008 and 2020.46 The SEC’s proposal admitted that the support
provided by money market funds for short-term wholesale funding markets “may be sustainable,
in part, due to perceived government backstops of money market funds and lack of transparency
to investors about the risks inherent in money market fund investments.”47
Thus, the SEC’s proposal recognized that money market funds with fixed NAVs produce
market distortions, depend on implicit government guarantees, and do not provide full
transparency to investors. Nevertheless, the SEC’s proposal rejected the option of requiring all
money market funds to adopt floating NAVs. That rejection suggests that the SEC would be
equally unprepared to force stablecoins to abandon their promised 1:1 parity with the U.S. dollar
– a promise that conveys to investors the same illusion of deposit-like status.
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Id. at 234.
Id. at 236-38.
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Id. at 237-38; see also Wilmarth, “Pandemic Crisis,” supra note 15, at 2-8, 12; Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks,
supra note 15, at 153-57, 278-87, 341-44, 353-56.
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SEC Money Market Fund Proposal, supra note 43, at 238.
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Like money market funds, stablecoins are “shadow deposits” – a type of “private money”
that is designed to serve as a functional substitute for federally-insured bank deposits. The
bailouts of money market funds in 2008 and 2020 and the close similarities between those funds
and stablecoins strongly support the conclusion that both types of financial instruments should be
regulated in the same way as bank deposits to control their systemic dangers.48 As shown by the
vicissitudes of money market funds, regulating stablecoins as investment companies under the
1940 Act would not provide an adequate substitute for requiring stablecoins to comply with the
regulatory regime governing FDIC-insured bank deposits.
An additional factor supporting that conclusion is that the SEC lacks broad financial
stability powers comparable to the extensive prudential regulatory and supervisory authorities of
federal banking agencies. The SEC’s core mission is to protect investors and preserve the
integrity of securities markets. The SEC generally has not attempted to act as a financial
stability regulator.49 As shown in the next two sections, regulating stablecoins as deposits and
requiring their issuers and distributors to become FDIC-insured banks would provide the most
promising approach for controlling their systemic perils.
b.

The Department of Justice should enforce Section 21(a) of the GlassSteagall Act against issuers and distributors of stablecoins.

Novi provides deposit-like treatment for stablecoins that its customers buy and hold in
their accounts. Novi sells stablecoins (currently Pax Dollars) to its customers at a fixed price of
$1 per coin, and Novi agrees to redeem stablecoins from its customers at the same price of $1 per

Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 21-24, 33-35; Wilmarth, “Pandemic Crisis,” supra note 15, at 6-10.
See Congressional Research Service, “Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory
Framework” (CRS Report No. R44918, updated Mar. 10, 2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf; Daniel K.
Tarullo, “The SEC should – and can – pay more attention to financial stability” (May 13, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/13/the-sec-should-and-can-pay-more-attention-to-financialstability/; see generally Barr, Tahyar & Jackson, supra note 42, at 444-502, 535-64.
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coin.50 Novi’s customers own the stablecoins held in their accounts, and Novi agrees to maintain
custody of its customer’s stablecoins until they are redeemed, withdrawn, or transferred to other
persons.51 Novi enables its customers to
(i) purchase and hold Digital Currency in your Account, (ii) conduct person-toperson transfers of Digital Currency, (iii) set up recurring Digital Currency
transactions, (iv) convert your Digital Currency to local currency and pick up
cash; (iv) convert your Digital Currency to local currency and transfer to your
linked bank account via an automated clearing house (“ACH”) transaction; and
(vi) use any additional features we may provide through your use of the
Services.52
The services that Novi provides to its customers through their stablecoin accounts satisfy
both of the key functional characteristics of “deposits”: (1) the placing of funds with another
person for custody and safekeeping, and (2) the ability of the depositor to withdraw or transfer
those funds on demand or at a definite time. In a 1991 decision, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, “[a]s commonly understood, the term ‘deposit’ means a sum of money placed
in the custody of a bank, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor.”53 Similarly, in a 2016
decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

Novi Financial, Inc., “How It Works: Add money” (“Simply add a debit card to put money in your account, and
it’ll be converted to USDP. On Novi, 1 USDP is equal to 1 US dollar.”), https://www.novi.com/how-it-works; Novi
Terms of Service, supra note 19, ¶ 3 (“User Redemption Right”) (“You are entitled to redeem each Digital Currency
for one U.S. dollar (USD) with Novi.”).
51
Novi Terms of Service, supra note 19, ¶ 3 (“Title and Ownership”) (“Your Account will give you access to buy,
sell, transfer, and manage your Digital Currency. The Digital Currency is held by Novi on a blockchain in one or
more blockchain addresses (each, a ‘Wallet’). . . . Novi controls the Wallet that holds your Digital Currency. . . .
[Y]ou own all beneficial interest in the Digital Currency in your Account.”); id. ¶ 3 (“Custody”) (“To more securely
custody [sic] Digital Currency, we may use one or more shared, commingled Wallets to hold Digital Currency
on your behalf and on our own behalf.”).
52
Novi Terms of Service, supra note 19, ¶ 5 (“Description of the Services”).
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United States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991).
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The relevant authorities demonstrate that the essential elements of a “deposit”
include the following. First, a deposit must involve the placement of funds with
another for “safekeeping.” . . . Second, those funds must be subject to the control
of the depositor such that they are repayable on demand or at a fixed time.54
As shown above, Novi clearly accepts “deposits” by agreeing to (i) receive funds from its
customers, (ii) convert those funds into stablecoins at a fixed 1:1 parity with U.S. dollars, (iii)
maintain custody of the stablecoins owned by its customers, (iv) repay its customers’ funds
based on the same fixed parity when its customers decide to redeem their stablecoins, and (v)
allow its customers to transfer their stablecoins to other persons. Courts have repeatedly held
that nonbanks are deemed to receive “deposits” if they accept funds from other persons while
agreeing to hold those funds and repay them on demand or at a specified time. The ability of
customers to transfer their funds to third parties is not a prerequisite for status as “deposits,” but
their right to transfer their funds to third parties provides additional evidence that a deposit
relationship has been formed.55
Section 21(a) of the Glass-Steagall Act establishes two overlapping prohibitions against
the receipt of deposits by nonbanks. Section 21(a)(1) focuses on persons who are engaged in
securities activities. Section 21(a)(1) bars issuers, underwriters, distributors, and sellers of

MoneyGram Int’l, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 15-60527, 664 Fed. Appx. 386, 392 (5th Cir., Nov. 15, 2016)
(citations omitted); see also MoneyGram Int’l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 999 F.3d 269, 274-76 (5th Cir. 2021).
55
United States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d at 174 (holding that the defendant (an individual) accepted a “deposit” when he
“took custody” of $150,000 on behalf of a purported foreign bank and “agreed to return it at the will” of the
depositor, stating “[y]our money will be here for your use”); In re Thaxton Group, Inc., Securities Litigation, C/A
No. 8:02-2612-GRA, 2006 WL 8462530, at *1–*3, *9–*14 (D.S.C., Mar. 20, 2006) (holding that the defendant (a
nonbank finance company) accepted “deposits” by selling $121 million of demand notes to 5,000 investors, thereby
“taking money from investors in return for a promise to return the funds on demand,” and explaining that the “notes
were designed to imitate bank certificates of deposit and money market accounts in order to attract bank depositors
to the note program”); S & N Equipment Co. v. Casa Grande Cotton Finance Co., 97 F.3d 337, 340–45 (9th Cir.
1996) (determining that the defendant (a nonbank finance company) accepted “demand deposits” for purposes of the
BHC Act because the defendant “accepted funds from its customers,” placed those funds in “credit accounts,” and
allowed customers to “withdraw funds as needed” and transfer funds to third parties).
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“stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities” from also “engag[ing] at the same time to
any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or repayment upon
presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of
the depositor.”56 If Novi’s stablecoins are determined to be “securities,” Novi would be
“engag[ing] at the same time” in both (1) issuing, underwriting, distributing, or selling
“securities” and (2) receiving “deposits” that are (A) withdrawn or transferred by customers
using functional equivalents of “checks” or (B) repaid to customers upon their request. Section
21(a)(1) clearly forbids that combination of activities.57
Court decisions have treated “deposits” as also being “securities” for purposes of the
federal securities laws unless those deposits are accepted either by FDIC-insured U.S. banks or
by foreign banks subject to a regulatory regime that provides comparable protections to
depositors.58 Based on those decisions, Novi’s stablecoins would be subject to regulation as both
“deposits” and “securities” because Novi is not chartered or regulated as a bank and does not
have FDIC insurance. Accordingly, DOJ should determine that Novi’s stablecoins violate
Section 21(a)(1) if those stablecoins are found to be “securities.”
Section 21(a)(2) of the Glass-Steagall Act is a broader and more sweeping provision.
Section 21(a)(2) prohibits all persons (regardless of whether they are also involved in
“securities” activities) from “engag[ing], to any extent whatever . . . in the business of receiving
deposits” – described with the functional characteristics included in Section 21(a)(1) – unless
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12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1).
For court decisions applying Section 21(a)(1) and holding that the relevant terms – including “securities,”
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those persons satisfy one of three alternative sets of regulatory criteria. Under Section 21(a)(2),
a person who engages in the business of receiving deposits must (A) be chartered and authorized
to “engage in such business” by, and subject to examination and regulation under, federal laws or
the laws of a state, U.S. territory, or the District of Columbia, or (B) be “permitted by” federal
laws or the laws of a state, U.S. territory, or the District of Columbia to “engage in such
business” and also be subject under the laws of that jurisdiction to “examination and regulation,”
or (C) submit to “periodic examination by the banking authority” of the state, territory, or
District of Columbia where “such business is carried on,” and publish “periodic reports of its
condition,” in “the same manner and under the same conditions” as are required by the laws of
such state, territory, or District for chartered banks “engaged in such business in the same
locality.”59

It bears repeating that Section 21(a)(2) – unlike Section 21(a)(1) – applies to all

persons who engage in the business of receiving deposits, regardless of whether they are also
issuing, underwriting, distributing, or selling “securities.”
Paragraphs (A) and (B) of Section 21(a)(2) cover much of the same ground – as both
paragraphs refer to institutions that are legally authorized to engage in “the business of receiving
deposits” – except that paragraph (A) refers to chartering, examination, and regulation while
paragraph (B) refers to examination and regulation but not chartering. Paragraph (C) describes
persons who are subject to “periodic examination” by a state, District, or territorial “banking
authority” and who also submit “periodic reports,” with such examination and reports to be made
“in the same manner and under the same conditions” as are required for chartered banks engaged
in the business of receiving deposits in the same state, District, or territory. The crucial point is
that all three paragraphs in Section 21(a)(2) refer to institutions that are either chartered as,
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regulated as, or subject to the same examination and reporting requirements as, deposit-taking
banks. Persons who do not satisfy the criteria set forth in any of the three paragraphs would
violate Section 21(a)(2) if they engage “to any extent whatever . . . in the business of receiving
deposits.”60
As explained above, Novi’s activities satisfy Section 21(a)’s functional description of
engaging in the “business of receiving deposits subject to check or repayment . . . upon request
of the depositor.” Novi’s deposit-taking business violates Section 21(a)(2) – regardless of
whether its stablecoins are treated as “securities” – because Novi does not satisfy any of the
criteria set forth in paragraphs (A), (B), or (C). Novi is not chartered as a deposit-taking bank
under federal or state laws. Novi is not permitted by federal or state laws to engage in the
business of receiving deposits while being examined and regulated in connection with that
business. Novi also is not complying with the same examination and reporting requirements as
are applied by the “banking authority” of the relevant state, District, or territory to chartered,
deposit-taking banks.
Section 21(b) imposes criminal sanctions on persons who violate Section 21(a), and DOJ
is therefore responsible for enforcing the statute. In October 1979, a New York savings bank
sent a letter to DOJ and the SEC alleging that Merrill Lynch was violating Section 21(a) by
offering “cash management” money market funds that were unlawful “deposits.” DOJ’s
Criminal Division issued an opinion in December 1979, which rejected the savings bank’s
allegations based on a highly formalistic analysis. DOJ classified money market funds as equity
investments rather than debt claims, and DOJ concluded that only debt claims could be treated as
“deposits” under Section 21(a). DOJ ignored the fact that Merrill Lynch provided its customers
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Id.; see United States v. Jenkins, 943 F.2d at 173-74; In re Thaxton Group, Inc., Securities Litigation, supra note
55, at *1-*3, *9-*14.
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with the functional equivalent of deposits by (i) maintaining a stable value – a fixed NAV of $1
per share – for the money market funds held in customer accounts, (iii) allowing customers to
withdraw their funds with the same stable value by making redemption requests or writing
checks, and (iii) enabling customers to transfer their funds with the same stable value to third
parties by writing checks.61
DOJ’s 1979 opinion should not be considered a binding precedent. That opinion’s
formalistic reasoning is not consistent with either Section 21(a)’s functional description of
“deposits” or the statute’s purpose to “prohibit[] . . . unregulated private banking so far as
practicable.” The 1979 opinion’s reasoning also is not compatible with the functional, pragmatic
approach of at least two courts that interpreted Section 21(a) more recently.62 DOJ should
undertake a fresh review of Section 21(a) and should determine that the statute’s functional
description of “deposits” includes funds that are received from and held on behalf of customers
with the understanding that customers may withdraw or transfer those funds by using “checks”
(or functionally equivalent methods of payment) or by making “requests” for repayment.
Based on the foregoing determination, DOJ should issue a rule declaring that issuers and
distributors of stablecoins providing a fixed 1:1 parity with the U.S. dollar or another widelyused fiat currency are “engag[ing] . . . in the business of receiving deposits” if they receive funds
from customers, hold stablecoins on behalf of customers, and allow customers to redeem,

Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 10-12, 33-35; Howell E. Jackson & Morgan Ricks, “Locating Stablecoins
Within the Regulatory Perimeter,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Aug. 5, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/05/locating-stablecoins-within-the-regulatory-perimeter/.; Wilmarth,
Taming the Megabanks, supra note 25, at 153-54.
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at *1-*3, *9-*14; Jackson & Ricks, supra note 61 (“The legislative history of section 21(a)(2) confirms that the
provision was intended to ‘prohibit[]. . . unregulated private banking so far as practicable.’”) (quoting Senate Report
No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935)). See also Gorton & Zhang, supra note 7, at 10-12, 33-35; Wilmarth,
“Pandemic Crisis,” supra note 15, at 8, 20-21 n.45; Wilmarth, Taming the Megabanks, supra note 25, at 137-39,
153-54.
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withdraw, or transfer their stablecoins. Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1), DOJ’s rule should prohibit
issuers and distributors of stablecoins that are determined to be “securities” from also receiving,
holding, and allowing redemptions, withdrawals, or transfers of customers’ stablecoins.
For stablecoins that are determined not to be “securities,” DOJ’s rule should describe the
criteria that issuers and distributors of those stablecoins must satisfy under Section 21(a)(2).
DOJ’s rule should make clear that issuers and distributors of stablecoins may not receive, hold,
and allow redemptions, withdrawals, or transfers of customers’ stablecoins unless those issuers
and distributors are either (A) chartered, examined, and regulated as deposit-taking banks, or (B)
legally authorized to engage in the business of receiving deposits while also being examined and
regulated in their conduct of that business, or (C) complying with the same examination and
reporting requirements as are applied to deposit-taking banks by the “banking authority” of the
relevant state, District, or U.S. territory.63
Some might argue that DOJ should not bring enforcement proceedings against issuers
and distributors of stablecoins under Section 21(a) unless DOJ takes similar measures against
other nonbanks providing financial services that are functionally equivalent to deposits. Such
nonbanks would include money market funds as well as payment service providers such as
PayPal and its subsidiary Venmo, which hold customer balances and allow customers to
withdraw or transfer those balances to others. I would personally welcome a decision by DOJ to
take an across-the-board approach, and I believe DOJ would have authority under Section 21(a)
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to institute enforcement proceedings against money market funds, PayPal, and Venmo.64
However, DOJ is not required to act against all violators of Section 21(a) at the same time. DOJ
could reasonably decide to focus on stablecoins as a particularly dangerous form of unauthorized
deposit-taking that should be stopped before DOJ determines how to deal with similar problems
created by money market funds, PayPal, and Venmo.65
c.

Congress should pass legislation mandating that all issuers and
distributors of stablecoins must be FDIC-insured banks.
i.

Requiring all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be
FDIC-insured banks would remove uncertainties and gaps in
Section 21(a) of the Glass-Steagall Act.

I strongly support PWG’s recommendation that Congress should “promptly” pass
legislation requiring all issuers of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks.66 Such legislation is
urgently needed to overcome uncertainties and gaps that currently exist in Section 21(a) of the
Glass-Steagall Act. As explained in the preceding section, an issuer or distributor of stablecoins
could offer services that are functionally equivalent to deposits and avoid violating Section 21(a)
if it could show that (1) its stablecoins are not “securities,” and (2) it is either (A) chartered,
regulated, and examined as a deposit-taking bank, or (B) legally authorized to engage in the
business of receiving deposits and subject to examination and regulation in conducting that
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business, or (C) subject to the same examination and reporting requirements as are applied to
chartered, deposit-taking banks by the “banking authority” of the relevant state, District, or U.S.
territory.
The terms of Section 21(a)(2) contain potential ambiguities that would need to be
resolved by DOJ and the courts. For example, what precise levels of examination and regulation
are needed to satisfy paragraph (B), and what exact types of examinations and reports are
required to comply with paragraph (C)? States that wanted to attract entry by stablecoin issuers
and distributors could enact laws designed to exploit those ambiguities by granting the most
lenient possible treatment to stablecoin providers.67
Even more troubling, an issuer or distributor of stablecoins would qualify under
paragraph (A) of Section 21(a)(2) if it could obtain a charter for an uninsured depository
institution from a federal or state banking authority. Until recently, a deposit-taking bank could
not receive either a federal or state charter unless it also obtained deposit insurance from the
FDIC and became subject to the full panoply of laws governing FDIC-insured banks. Federal
law currently requires all national banks that accept deposits to obtain FDIC insurance. Prior to
2019, every state required state-chartered banks to obtain FDIC insurance as a precondition for
accepting deposits.68
A number of the state laws mandating FDIC insurance for state-chartered banks were
enacted in response to widespread failures of non-federally-insured depository institutions during
the 1980s and early 1990s. During that period, state-sponsored, privately-funded insurance
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systems for state-chartered depository institutions collapsed in several states, with the worst
disasters occurring in Ohio, Maryland, and Rhone Island. The injuries suffered by depositors
and local economies were particularly severe in Rhode Island, where non-federally-insured
depositors lost access to at least some of their deposits for nearly three years.69
Despite the dismal record of non-federally-insured depository institutions, Wyoming and
Nebraska have passed laws during the past two years that authorize charters for uninsured
“special purpose depository institutions” (SPDIs) in Wyoming and uninsured “digital asset
depositories” (DADs) in Nebraska. Wyoming and Nebraska allow SPDIs and DADs to accept
deposits (including deposits of digital assets) and engage in other cryptocurrency-related
activities without obtaining FDIC insurance. Wyoming has already approved four SPDI
charters, including one awarded to Kraken, a major cryptocurrency venture.70
In December 2020, Figure Technologies (Figure) applied to the OCC to obtain a charter
for a national bank that would accept only “jumbo” deposits larger than $250,000 (the current
limit for federal deposit insurance). Figure asserted that it could avoid any obligation to obtain
FDIC insurance by accepting only jumbo deposits. The OCC has not acted on Figure’s
application, and state regulators have challenged the OCC’s legal authority to approve any
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charters for uninsured, deposit-taking national banks.71 Nevertheless, Figure and other
cryptocurrency companies recently met with the Fed, FDIC, and OCC to discuss “how to issue a
stablecoin that satisfies” regulators.72
Wyoming’s and Nebraska’s new laws and Figure’s charter application are designed to
produce charters for uninsured deposit-taking banks that can issue and distribute stablecoins and
engage in other cryptocurrency activities. As indicated above, uninsured banks – if lawfully
chartered and legally authorized to receive deposits – could issue and distribute stablecoins that
are not “securities” without violating Section 21(a)(2)(A) of the Glass-Steagall Act. They also
would not be required to comply with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) or the BHC
Act. As explained in the next section, the FDI Act and the BHC Act establish crucial public
interest safeguards that govern FDIC-insured banks and their parent companies.73 Congress
should make certain that those safeguards apply to all institutions that engage in the business of
receiving either bank deposits or “shadow deposits.” Ongoing efforts by cryptocurrency
ventures to obtain charters for uninsured, deposit-taking banks have cast a very bright light on a
dangerous gap in existing laws. Congress must quickly pass legislation that will close that gap
by requiring all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks.
ii.

Congress should require all issuers and distributors of
stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks, thereby bringing those
entities within the scope of the FDI Act and the BHC Act.
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PWG’s report urged Congress to act “promptly” in passing legislation that would require
all issuers of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks.74 The same requirement should apply to
entities, such as Facebook’s Novi, that distribute stablecoins issued by other companies. Firms
that distribute stablecoins to the public should not be allowed to avoid compliance with the FDI
Act and the BHC Act simply because their deposit-taking and payment networks employ
stablecoins issued by other companies.
Legislation requiring all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks
would guarantee that those firms must comply with crucial public interest safeguards in the FDI
Act. Those safeguards include: (a) deposit insurance coverage, payment of risk-based deposit
insurance premiums, and reporting and examination requirements under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817,
1820 & 1821; (b) supervisory and enforcement powers granted to federal bank regulators under
12 U.S.C. § 1818; (c) procedures for resolving failed and failing banks under 12 U.S.C. §§
1821(c), 1822 & 1823; (d) risk-based capital requirements and other safety and soundness
standards under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831p-1 & 3901-07; (e) prompt corrective action remedies under
12 U.S.C. § 1831o; (f) safety and soundness requirements and protections for competition that
govern proposed changes in control of banks and bank mergers under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j) &
1828(c); (f) prohibitions on abusive tying practices under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-77; (f) “source of
strength” obligations and capital requirements for parent companies of FDIC-insured banks
under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831o-1 & 5371(b); (g) community reinvestment duties under 12 U.S.C. §§
3901-08; and (h) expedited funds availability requirements under 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10.
Mandating status as FDIC-insured banks for all issuers and distributors of stablecoins
would also make certain that those entities are treated as “banks” for purposes of the BHC Act.75
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The BHC Act requires all companies that own or control FDIC-insured banks to comply with
additional public interest safeguards, including (a) safety and soundness standards and
protections for competition governing proposed acquisitions of banks under 12 U.S.C. § 1842;
(b) limitations on permissible nonbanking activities under 12 U.S.C. § 1843; (c) the Fed’s
authority to conduct examinations, require reports, bring enforcement actions, adopt supervisory
rules, and impose risk-based capital requirements under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818, 1844, 1847, &
5371(b); and (d) privacy protections that (i) prohibit financial holding companies from disclosing
nonpublic customer information to unaffiliated third parties against their customers’ wishes, and
(ii) bar third parties from using false or deceptive practices to obtain such information (15 U.S.C.
§§ 6801-09, 6821-27).
One of the BHC Act’s most important provisions is 12 U.S.C. § 1843, which prohibits
companies that own or control banks from engaging in commercial activities or owning
commercial enterprises. Section 1843 prevents the formation of banking-and-commercial
conglomerates that would pose grave dangers to our society, financial system, and economy,
including (1) hazardous concentrations of economic and financial power and political influence,
(2) toxic conflicts of interest that would destroy the ability of banks to act objectively in
providing credit and other services, and (3) risks of systemic contagion between financial and
commercial sectors that could inflict enormous losses on the federal “safety net” for banks
(including the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund, the Fed’s discount window, and the Fed’s
guarantee for interbank payments made on Fedwire, as well as the federal government’s explicit
and implicit protections for “too big to fail” banking organizations). Requiring all issuers and
distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks would prevent stablecoin ventures from
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being owned or controlled by commercial enterprises, including Big Tech firms like Apple,
Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft.76
Stopping Big Tech firms from acquiring ownership or control of issuers and distributors
of stablecoins should be a top priority for financial regulators and Congress. Big Tech firms
already enjoy significant advantages over traditional providers of financial services in areas such
as automation, artificial intelligence, data management, and mobile payments. The rapid
expansion of Ant Financial (Alipay) and Tencent (WePay) in China – prior to the crackdown on
both companies by Chinese authorities in 2020 – indicates that Big Tech firms could potentially
dominate major segments of our financial industry if they were allowed to offer deposit and
payment services. The entry of Big Tech firms into the banking business would create a wide
range of potential threats, including unfair competition, market dominance, predatory lending,
abusive sharing of customer data and other violations of customer privacy rights, as well as much
greater risks of systemic contagion across financial and nonfinancial sectors of our economy
during financial crises and severe economic downturns.77
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Facebook’s plan to offer deposit and payment services through Novi poses unacceptable
threats to consumer privacy and welfare. Facebook has repeatedly abused its customers’ privacy
rights and has reportedly marketed products that it knew were harmful to its customers. In 2012,
Facebook entered into a consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to settle
charges that it deceived customers and violated its promises to allow customers to control the
privacy of information they posted on Facebook. In 2019, Facebook paid a $5 billion fine to
resolve the FTC’s charges that Facebook violated the privacy commitments included in the 2012
consent decree.78 The FTC recently launched a new investigation of Facebook after a
whistleblower informed Congress that Facebook knew from its internal research that some of its
products caused mental health problems in minors as well as other harms to customers.79
Facebook has long sought to enter the financial services industry to extend its dominance
over social networks and expand its access to customer information. In 2012, Facebook founder
and CEO Mark Zuckerberg said that the launch of a successful payment service would give
Facebook “a pretty awesome combo and a good reason for people to use [Facebook’s] platform,”
as well as making it “more acceptable for us to charge them quite a bit more for using [our]
platform.”80 Offering deposit and payment services would greatly increase Facebook’s ability to
access, leverage, and monetize its customers’ private information. As Open Markets Institute
recently pointed out,
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Facebook occupies a dominant role in American life and indeed the lives of
people around the world, with over 1 billion users for four of its services,
including Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp. Facebook is also a
giant in the advertising space, with their 2020 advertising revenue close to $84.2
billion dollars — nearly $1.6 billion each week.81
A 2020 House subcommittee staff study found that “Facebook has monopoly power in
the market for social networking” and has exploited that market power by becoming a
“gatekeeper” with “outsized power to control the fates of other companies.”82 Facebook
generates most of its revenues by selling digital advertising. Facebook’s access to the private
information of hundreds of millions of customers enables it to command much higher prices for
its sales of advertising, compared with its competitors.83 The House staff study concluded that
Facebook’s dominance of the social networking market – like Google’s dominance of the
Internet search market – allows Facebook to “abuse consumers’ privacy without losing
customers.”84 As one expert advised the House subcommittee:
Facebook and Google have built comprehensive dossiers on almost everyone, and
they can sell incredibly targeted advertisement on that basis. . . . But doing so
represents an inherent violation of the receiver’s privacy. Every ad targeted using
personal information gathered without explicit, informed consent is at some level
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a violation of privacy. And Facebook and Google are profiting immensely by
selling these violations to advertisers.85
Novi’s deposit and payment services could enable Facebook to collect and monetize a
vast array of data about its customers’ financial assets and transactions. The treasure trove of
nonpublic customer information that Big Tech firms could capture by offering deposit and
payment services is indicated by the huge data set compiled by JPMorgan Chase Institute
(JPMCI). JPMCI has collected and analyzed a massive pool of information, drawn from the
records of JPMorgan Chase (JPMC), the largest U.S. bank, containing the “saving, spending, and
borrowing habits of the bank’s customers.” The Fed “has used the Institute’s research when
weighing interest-rate decisions,” thereby confirming the enormous value of JPMC’s
comprehensive information about its customers’ financial dealings.86 Allowing Facebook and
other Big Tech firms to build similar data sets by offering deposit and payment services would
increase exponentially their ability to monetize customer information and degrade customer
privacy by secretly transferring that information to third-party sellers of goods and services.
Requiring all issuers and distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks would
guarantee that all companies that own or control those entities must comply with the privacy
protections governing financial holding companies (15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09, 6821-27). That
requirement would also prevent Facebook and other Big Tech firms from offering deposit and
payment services built around stablecoins. The PWG Report correctly determined that “the
combination of a stablecoin issuer or [digital] wallet provider and a commercial firm could lead
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to an excessive concentration of economic power,” which could “restrict access” to credit and
other financial services and have “detrimental effects on competition.”87
Our nation stands at a crossroads. We can maintain the BHC Act’s longstanding policy
of separating banking and commerce, thereby preserving a financial sector, a national economy,
and a society that are not compromised by toxic conflicts of interest, exploited by unfair
competitive advantages, or dominated by the overwhelming economic power and political
influence of giant banking-and-commercial conglomerates. Or we can allow Facebook and other
Big Tech firms to enter the banking business and leverage their stablecoin ventures to create
massive “shadow banking” empires, thereby subverting the BHC Act’s separation of banking
and commerce. In that event, Big Tech firms might well gain dominance over our banking
industry – either by building their own financial kingdoms or by combining with our largest
banks – thereby creating the very evils that the BHC Act was designed to prevent.88
iii.

The FDIC should not approve pass-through deposit insurance
coverage for stablecoins.

The FDIC is reportedly considering the possibility of allowing FDIC-insured banks to
hold reserves deposited by stablecoin issuers and provide “pass-through” deposit insurance
coverage to customers of those issuers.89 The FDIC currently grants pass-through deposit
insurance coverage to holders of stored-value cards if the issuers of those cards satisfy the
following conditions: (i) each issuer must establish a custodial deposit account at an FDICinsured bank to hold the funds owned by card holders, (ii) the issuer must allow card holders to
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access their funds at the bank through withdrawals or transfers to third parties, (iii) the bank’s
records must confirm that the issuer has established a custodial deposit account holding funds
owned by card holders, (iv) either the bank’s records or the issuer’s records must show, on an
accurate and current basis, the identity of each card holder and the amount of funds owned by
that holder, and (v) the issuer must inform card holders that their funds are held in a custodial
account at the bank.90
Approving pass-through deposit insurance for stablecoins would involve a number of
operational difficulties. One of the most significant challenges would be the requirement that
either the custodial bank or the stablecoin issuer must maintain current and accurate records
showing the identity of each holder of stablecoins and the amount of stablecoins owned by that
holder. As the PWG’s report pointed out,
The majority of the stablecoin market currently operates on public blockchains
where transactions may be pseudonymous, meaning the identity of the sender or
the receiver of a transaction is unknown, but other transactional information is
available (e.g., the amount, the time, the value, etc.).”91
Indeed, the relative anonymity of transactions conducted with stablecoins – compared with
traditional payment methods other than cash – is a major reason for the popularity of
stablecoins.92
It is difficult to envision how stablecoin issuers and custodial banks could maintain
accurate and current records showing the identities of holders of stablecoins and the amounts of
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coins they own without changing the fundamental nature of stablecoin transactions that are
conducted on distributed ledgers (particularly in DeFi transactions). A financial journalist
recently described the following problems that stablecoin issuers would confront if “financial
regulators declare that all stablecoin owners must be verified”:
Building infrastructure to collect and verify the identity of all users [of
stablecoins], and not just the few who redeem or deposit, is expensive. To recoup
their costs, issuers . . . may consider introducing fees. All of this could render
stablecoins less accessible for people who only want to use them for casual
remittances.
. . . In DeFI, stablecoins are often deposited into accounts controlled by bits of
autonomous code, or smart contracts, which don't have any underlying owner.
It’s not evident how a stablecoin issuer can conduct KYC [compliance] on a smart
contract.93
Thus, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a stablecoin issuer or a custodial
bank to maintain an accurate and current record of the identities of stablecoin holders or the
amounts of coins they currently own in order to qualify for pass-through deposit insurance
coverage from the FDIC.
Moreover, granting pass-through deposit insurance coverage to holders of stablecoins
would not remove the systemic perils created by the issuers and distributors of those coins. Passthrough coverage would allow issuers and distributors of stablecoins and their customers to
benefit from access to the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund. Issuers, distributors, and customers
would also benefit indirectly from the custodial bank’s access to the Fed’s discount window
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advances and payments system guarantees, as well as other components of the federal safety net
for banks. In contrast, pass-through deposit insurance coverage would not require issuers and
distributors of stablecoins to comply with the FDI Act’s provisions that protect customers,
communities, businesses, and the stability of the banking system. In addition, pass-through
coverage would allow companies that own or control issuers and distributors of stablecoins to
avoid complying with the BHC Act’s safeguards, including the Fed’s regime of consolidated
regulation and supervision, the privacy rules governing financial holding companies, and the
separation of banking and commerce.
In sum, pass-through deposit insurance coverage would enable Facebook and other Big
Tech firms to offer deposit and payment services and receive extensive benefits from the federal
safety net for FDIC-insured banks without complying with the public interest mandates
governing those banks and their parent companies. Pass-through coverage would effectively
create a “back door” that allows Big Tech firms to compete directly with traditional banks,
undermine the BHC Act’s separation of banking and commerce, and circumvent other important
public interest safeguards.
Pass-through deposit insurance coverage for stablecoins would produce many of the
harmful effects of “rent-a-bank” arrangements, which the OCC approved when it adopted its socalled “true lender” rule in October 2020. The OCC’s rule declared that a national bank would
be treated as the “true lender” for a loan as long as the bank funded the loan at closing or was
named as the lender in the loan agreement, even if the bank transferred its entire interest and
entire risk in the loan to a nonbank “partner” the following day. Under the OCC’s rule,
nonbanks could have reaped the benefits that their national bank partners enjoyed under federal
statutes preempting the application of state usury laws and other state consumer protection laws
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to national banks.94 In June 2021, Congress passed a joint resolution that repealed the OCC’s
rule under the Congressional Review Act.95 Members of Congress who supported the joint
resolution condemned the OCC’s “true lender” rule for allowing predatory nonbank lenders “to
use superficial and deceptive partnerships with [national] banks to skirt state laws and charge
outrageous annual percentage rates” on loans they acquired from their national bank partners.96
The FDIC should reject pass-through deposit insurance coverage for stablecoins for the
same reasons that Congress repealed the OCC’s “true lender” rule. Issuers and distributors of
stablecoins should not be allowed to obtain the benefits provided by FDIC insurance and other
components of the federal safety net for banks unless those entities become FDIC-insured banks.
Issuers and distributors of stablecoins and their parent companies should not be allowed to use
“rent-a-bank” arrangements to engage in destructive regulatory arbitrage. Instead, they should
be required to comply fully with the essential public interest safeguards contained in the FDI Act
and the BHC Act.97
Conclusion
The PWG’s report provides a welcome blueprint for top-priority actions by regulatory
agencies and Congress. The SEC should use its existing powers to regulate stablecoins as
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“securities” and protect investors and securities markets. DOJ should designate stablecoins as
“deposits” and bring enforcement actions to prevent issuers and distributors of stablecoins from
violating Section 21(a) of the Glass-Steagall Act. To overcome uncertainties and gaps in the
remedies available to the SEC and DOJ, Congress should pass legislation requiring all issuers
and distributors of stablecoins to be FDIC-insured banks. The foregoing measures are urgently
needed to counteract the grave dangers that stablecoins pose to our society, financial system, and
economy.
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